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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CORPORATIONS
BY ESTOPPEL AND DE FACTO
CORPORATIONS
(IN WISCONSIN.)
There is, in the law of private corporations, a great confusion
existing, between estoppel to deny corporate existence and de
facto corporations. Some courts do not make any distinction nor
seek to make any discrimination, but prefer to use the terms in-
terchangeably, one overlapping the other. Even our own state
court has in certain decisions, referred to the one term when the
other should have been used. Thus they say in one case: "Every
fact points to an honest belief on their part that they had formed
a valid corporation and we, therefore, conclude that the corpora-
tion was at least a de facto corporation. Being such, and the de-
fendant having dealt with it on that basis, he is estopped from
saying that there was no legal corporation at least so far as
transactions within its supposed corporate powers are con-
cerned."' In an earlier case, the court says: "We hold that the
defendant cannot raise the question of the existence of the cor-
poration on the grounds of estoppel. As to the defendant, the
plaintiff as a corporation de facto, is sufficient."2  Some courts
hold expressly, that the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate
existence applies only to associations that are at least de facto
corporations; that it does not apply to associations possessing no
color of corporate existence. 3 To limit the rule of corporations
by estoppel to de facto corporations, gives rise to a mere anomaly.
By the weight of authority, everyone but the state is estopped to
deny the corporate existence of a de facto corporation. There
would certainly then, be no valid reason to invoke the doctrine of
estoppel, where there really exists a de facto corporation. As
clearly stated by one writer: "Where there is a de facto corpora-
tion, it is unnecessary to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, as the
general rule of public policy -forbids anyone but the state raising
the question of corporate existence."
From an analysis of the decisions of this state, it seems that
a de facto corporation need not exist to estop third parties from
'Gilman vs. Druse, iii Wis. 4oo.
'Black River Improvement Co. vs. Holway, 85 Wis. 344.
'Jones vs. Aspen Hardware Co., 21 Col. 263, 268, 52 American S. R. 22o.
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denying the corporate existence of a pretended corporation. Prob-
ably the best discussion of this principle is found in the two cases
involving the defendant, Head. In Slocum vs. Head4 and Clausent
vs. Head,' the court held the defendant not a de facto corporation.
In the first case, the plaintiff had treated the defendant as a part-
nership, and the court so adjudged it to be. In the latter case,
the plaintiff had treated the defendant as a corproation and had
so dealt with it. The court, therefore, held the defendant to be a
corporation by estoppel as against the plaintiff. As stated in the
second case: "If the appellant in the transaction out of which
the alleged claim arose, dealt with the association as a corporation,
such dealing, by estoppel as to such transaction, fixed the status
of the company to be what it was represented and recognized to
be therein." It is thus to be noted, that our court held a third
party could be estopped from denying the corporate existence of
an association, although such association was not a de facto cor-
poration.
In another case our court says that whether the certificate is
sufficient to prove the incorporation or not, or whether any de-
fects in it are cured, it seems to be unnecessary to determine.
The execution of a mortgage to a corporation is an admission
of its corporate existence and estops the mortgagor from denying
the same.'
Perhaps the most clinching argument for our statement, is
found in Citizens' Bank vs. Jones, where the court says: "With-
out determining whether the plaintiff payee was at the time of
the execution of the note a de facto corporation within the mean-
ing of the authorities, yet, we are constrained to hold that both
Mr. and Mrs. Jones, (defendants), by the execution and delivery
of the mortgage, are estopped from denying the corporate exist-
ence of the plaintiff."
Justice Marshall, in a rather recent opinion remarks :! "We
note what counsel says as to persons holding policies in the name
of the so-called new company not having participated in and so
perhaps, not being bound by, the adjudication that such company
is not a corporation in any sense and may hold it to be otherwise
4 Slocum v s. Head, 105 Wis. 431.
'Clausen vs. Head, IIO Wis. 405.
Witney vs. Robinson, 53 Wis. 309.
Citizens" Bank vs. Jones, 117 Wis. 455.
'Huber vs. Martin-, 127 Wis. 412.
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on the doctrine of estoppel. We are not unmindful of the rule
in that regard and that in some circumstances it extends beyond
corporations de facto and includes such cases as that of a collec-
tion of persons falsely assuming to be a corporation, where there
is no semblance of corporate existence. It does not apply, how-
ever, where the parties knew or ought to have known, the rea-
sonable belief in the corporate existence and- reasonable reliance
thereon, does not exist." This case simply brings out the rule in
Wisconsin that the doctrine of estoppel of third persons to deny
corporate existence is not predicated upon the doctrine of de
facto corporations but exists of itself, where the parties have so
dealt with one another to infer that there existed a transaction
with a legally incorporated body.
As to wherein a corporation by estoppel resembles a de facto
corporation, is our remaining inquiry. A de facto corporation can
exist only when there is a valid law under which a de jure cor-
poration could have been created and an unconstitutional law is
not sufficient to support a de facto corporation.9 Some courts
have held that on the theory that the doctrine of estoppel is
limited to de facto corporations, there is no estoppel to deny the
existence of a pretended corporation, where there is no law under
which it might exist, or what amounts to the same thing, if the
statute under which it claims to exist is unconstitutional."0 How-
ever, the contrary and the weight of authority, holds that the
existence of the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence
does not depend at all upon the right to be a corporation, or on
the existence of a corporation de facto, and therefore, persons
who hold themselves out as a corporation or who deal with a
pretended corporation, may be estopped to deny incorporation,
whether there is any valid law authorizing such a corporation or
not or whether the law under which the pretended corporation is
operating, has expired."
A corporation expressly prohibited by statute or contrary to
public policy, cannot escape liability under the defense of de facto
existence.' 2 Likewise, according to the weight of authority, the
doctrine in relation to estoppel to deny corporate existence does
'Martin vs. Huber, 127 Wis. 412, and Gilkey vs. How, 105 Wis. 41.
"Brandestein vs. Hoke, ioi Cal. 131, and Jones vs. Aspen Hardware
Co., supra.
"Black River Improvement Company vs. Holway, 85 Wis. 344.
"Evenson vs. Ellington, 67 Wis. 634.
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not apply where a pretended corporation is expressly prohibited
by statute or where it is contrary to public policy.1"
Without going into the authorities, it can be said that mem-
bers of a de facto corporation are as immune from personal lia-
bility as are members of a de jure corporation. By the weight
of authority, the rule that a person contracting with a corpora-
tion as such is estopped to deny its corporate existence, applies so
as to prevent him from denying its corporate existence for the
purpose of maintaining an action on the contract or on an implied
contract against the stockholders or members individually, unless
they have been guilty of fraud or there are other circumstances
rendering the doctrine of estoppel inapplicable in the particular
case. 14 In the Wisconsin case, the court says: "Where a person
deals with what he supposes is a corporation, with what all par-
ties think is a corporation, where he gives his credit to that sup-
posed corporation, he cannot afterwards, when it turns out that
it is not validly incorporated, turn around and say, 'Well, I dealt
with this supposed corporation; I thought it was a corporation
but it seems when it first attempted to become incorporated, that
there was some defect or irregularity in its proceedings, so that
it did not become legally incorporated and therefore you who are
stockholders will be held personally liable'." The Federal rule is
in accord with this Wisconsin decision.'5 It is to be particularly
noted that in the case just referred to, the court refused to hold
the association a de facto corporation, but nevertheless held it a
corporation by estoppel and the members free from any personal
liability to the plaintiff.
A de facto corporation can sue in contract or in tort, with the
same effect as can a corporation de jure, while an association of
individuals, who are a corporation by estoppel, as to certain per-
sons, can sue such persons only as a corporation in an action upon
contract.'6 It is said in this case: "Where a person enter into a
contract with a body purporting to be a corporation, and such
body is described by the contract by the corporate name which it
has assumed, or is otherwise clearly recognizdd as an existing
I Hossack vs. Ottowan Development Association, 244 Il1. 274 and Fletcher
on Corporations-Vol. i, 336.
" Clausen vs. Head, ilO Wis. 405, 85 N. W. 1O28 and 14 Corpus Juris, 231.
"In re Western Bank, 163 Federal 713 and 68 N. W. 370.
26 Citizens' Bank vs. Jones, 117 Wis. 446.
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corporation, such person thereby admits the legal existence of
the corporation for the purpose of any action that may be brought
to enforce the contract, and will not be permitted by a plea of
nul tiel corporation, to deny the legality of its corporate exist-
ence." Other Wisconsin cases are in accord." As to actions in
tort, by such corporation by estoppel, it may be said that where a
corporation by estoppel, which is not a de facto corporation,
brings an action to recover for or to enjoin a trespass or other
wrong, there is no principle on which the defendant can be held
to be estopped to deny the corporate existence of the plaintiff
and its capacity to sue unless he has in some way, in connection
with the alleged wrong, dealt with or recognized it as a corpora-
tion.
This permission to sue upon all transactions arising out of the
theory of estoppel to deny corporate existence, extends to all
cases where a third party deals with an association as a corpora-
tion, in the particular proceedings on hand. Thus, the Wisconsin
courts have held that he who gives a note to a corporation is
not to be permitted to deny that there is such a corporation, in a
suit brought by the corporation by estoppel, if such it can be
termed, against the maker of the note.' 8 Our court has also
held that the execution of a mortgage to a corporation is an
admission of its corporate existence and estops the mortgagor
from denying the same. 9 This rule applies to deeds granted to
associations, as corporations."
Mere dealing with an association under a corporate name,
according to the weight of authority, does not estop one from
denying corporate existence. 2' The doctrine does not apply, in
the words of Justice Marshall, to a case where the parties know
or ought to have known the true situation, for the essential ele-
ment, the reasonable belief in the corporate existence and reason-
able reliance thereon, does not exist. All the elements of any
ordinary case of estoppel must be present to have a corporation
by estoppel. The association must have been dealt with as a cor-
poration and as such alone, to create an estoppel to deny cor-
porate existence.
Mason vs. Nichols, 22 Wis. 360.
18 Congregational Society vs. Perry, 53 Wis. 316.
'o Witney vs. Robinson, see note 6, supra.
2 Marslzll on Private Corporations-Page 134.
= 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 314.
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Estoppel to deny corporate existence can arise in the plead-
ings of a case. A defendant who pleads a counterclaim in an
action by a corporation, is estopped to deny the plaintiff's cor-
porate existence.22 The doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate
existence applies to foreign as well as to domestic corporations.13
The state alone can attack the corporate existence of a cor-
poration, de -facto.24 A corporation by estoppel exists, of course,
only as against the person who deals with it as such and against
him alone can it set up its corporate existence. The state could
then, without question, institute quo warranto proceedings against
such a pretended corporation.2 1
The doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence by reason
of having contracted with an association as a corporation, is not
limited to contracts between a corporation and strangers but ap-
plies also, in the case of contracts between such association and
its stockholders or members."
To sum up it can be said, that estoppel to deny corporate
existence can arise without the presence of a de facto corporation,
and having so arisen, such corporation by estoppel possesses all
the benefits of a de facto corporation without being subjected to
any of its requirements. Such corporation by estoppel, has no
real existence in law, as has a de facto corporation, but is a mere
fiction, existing for the particular case, and vanishing where the
elements of estoppel are absent. A de facto corporation can exist
forever as a de jure corporation, if the state does not interfere,
but a corporation by estoppel must always look to the presence of
the estoppel without which it is no more than an association of
individuals, a partnership.
DAVID CHANESS, 1922.
'Black River Improvement Co vs. Holway, 85 Wis. 344.
i=5 Cal. 679 and 21 N. Y. 542.
"Farewell vr. Wolf, 96 Wis. io.
'Marshall on Private Corporation,, i42.
2Gilnmw vs. Druse, iiz Wis: 400.

